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Abstract—With the growth of Internet of Things (IoT) and mo-
bile edge computing, billions of smart devices are interconnected
to develop applications used in various domains including smart
homes, healthcare and smart manufacturing. Deep learning
has been extensively utilized in various IoT applications which
require huge amount of data for model training. Due to privacy
requirements, smart IoT devices do not release data to a remote
third party for their use. To overcome this problem, collaborative
approach to deep learning, also known as Collaborative Deep
Learning (CDL) has been largely employed in data-driven
applications. This approach enables multiple edge IoT devices to
train their models locally on mobile edge devices. In this paper,
we address IoT device training problem in CDL by analyzing the
behavior of mobile edge devices using a game-theoretic model,
where each mobile edge device aims at maximizing the accuracy
of its local model at the same time limiting the overhead of
participating in CDL. We analyze the Nash Equilibrium in an
N-player static game model. We further present a novel cluster-
based fair strategy to approximately solve the CDL game to
enforce mobile edge devices for cooperation. Our experimental
results and evaluation analysis in a real-world smart home
deployment show that 80% mobile edge devices are ready to
cooperate in CDL, while 20% of them do not train their local
models collaboratively.
Index Terms—Collaborative deep learning, IoT device, Edge
computing, Game Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Internet of Things (IoT) has grown rapidly
and billions of smart devices are expected to be added over
next few years. These devices generate a tremendous amount
of data, from health information [1] to social networking [2].
Deep learning models use this data for training and enhancing
intelligence of various data driven IoT applications. Most of
the IoT devices connect to a central cloud platform to use
cloud services. These cloud services are crucial for storage
of the datasets and model learning. However, use of cloud
services requires additional latency in real time applications.
To overcome this issue, edge devices are used for local data
training which also safeguards privacy of personal data. Unlike
constrained IoT devices, such devices have the capability to
support Machine Learning (ML) models and have been used
in various applications. For example, video doorbell performs
training on its local datasets, and identifies person at the door.
Deep learning models are often associated with the size
of training dataset. Under a reasonable learning mechanism,
more training data will enhance the accuracy and performance
of a trained model. However, in the era of big data, data
is often distributed and cannot be brought together due to
personal privacy constraints. Collaborative Deep Learning
(CDL) allows multiple IoT devices to train their models,
without revealing associated personal data. CDL offers an
attractive trade-off between privacy and utility of data sets.
Recent research [3], [4] have discussed the privacy issues
of local training devices and the impact of communication
latency between IoT edge devices and Parameter Server (PS).
However, the strategic behavior of the rational local training
devices have not been discussed in previous research, i.e.,
the authors have assumed that all IoT devices are altruistic.
Altruistic devices are ones which always follow a suggested
protocol (what all devices have decided to follow initially)
regardless whether they are benefiting or losing by following
this protocol. However, devices are not altruistic in real life,
they are rational. Rational devices are the ones which will
deviate from suggested protocol if they think that they will
be benefited more by following a different protocol. In our
proposed system model, we assume that all the mobile edge
devices are rational.
A mobile edge device, which has low quality data, always
wants to be a part of CDL to increase accuracy of its local
model. Other mobile edge devices, who have high quality data,
do not want to collaborate with low quality data holder mobile
edge device. Therefore, there is a dilemma for mobile edge
devices to participate or not in CDL. In this paper, we address
this research problem of learner’s dilemma by proposing a
general system model, a CDL game model, and a novel cluster-
based fair strategy which enables each participant to cooperate
in CDL based on the clusters formed to achieve overall benefit
to itself in training the local ML model. We also evaluate
our CDL game model and novel cluster-based strategy in
smart home deployment using ARAS dataset [5]. The main
contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) We identify the problem of unfair cooperation of partic-
ipants in CDL. A local training device, which has low
quality data builds its learning model to take advantage
from other device, which has high quality data.
2) We address this research problem by analyzing the behav-
ior of mobile edge devices using a game-theoretic model,



















local model with minimal cost of participating in CDL.
3) We introduce a system model for CDL and propose a
solution of above defined problem.
4) We also implement a cluster-based fair algorithm on
ARAS dataset [5], and the results reflect that proposed
solution elicit cooperation in CDL.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
relevant work and related background. System model along
with rational assumption is discussed in Section III. Game
model and game analysis are explained in Section IV and
Section V respectively. Section VI presents implementation
of proposed system model along with results. Section VII
concludes the paper with future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we describe related work on information
leakage on deep learning models, privacy-preserving deep
learning and game models.
A. Information leakage on Deep Learning Models
Information leakage of individuals’ private data has become
a well known problem for deep learning models. Data masking
techniques, such as pseudonymize and anonymize are used to
prevent this problem. In pseudonymize, data can be traced
back into its original state, whereas it becomes impossible
to return data into its original state in anonymize. However,
indirect re-identification could be possible in anonymize. For
example, Netflix released a hundred million anonymized film
ratings which was matched with the other dataset Internet
Movie Database (IMDb).
Cloud platforms such as Google and Amazon offer various
services ”AI Deep Learning”. Any customer can upload a
dataset to use the service and pay to build a prediction model,
which works as black-box API. The membership inference
attack on black-box API is discussed in [6], [7]. An attacker
asks queries to target the model and receives the model’s
prediction. Rahman et al. [8] show that differentially private
deep model can also fail against membership inference attack.
A novel white-box membership inference attack was proposed
by Nasr et al. [9], against deep learning algorithms to measure
their training datasets membership leakage. Melis et al. [10]
demonstrate that the updated parameter leaks information of
participants, thus develops passive and active inference attacks
to exploit this leakage.
B. Privacy-Preserving Deep Learning
Each participant has its own sensitive datasets, which needs
to be protected the dataset from information leakage. Various
privacy mechanisms, such as Secure Multi-party Communi-
cation (SMC) [11], Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [12], and
Differential Privacy (DP) [13] have been proposed to protect
the datasets in CDL. SMC helps to protect intermediate steps
of the computation. Mohassel et al. [14] adopt a two-server
model for privacy-preserving training, used by previous work
on privacy-preserving deep learning via SMC [15].
However, Aono et al. [16] pointed out that the local data
may be actually leaked to an honest-but-curious server. Using
additively HE techniques fix several problems and also have
some drawbacks. To obscure an individual’s identity, DP adds
mathematical noise to a small sample of the individual’s usage
pattern. Prior work [3], [17]–[19] use differential privacy on
privacy-preserving CDL system to protect privacy of training
data. However, Hitaj et al. [20] pointed out that privacy
preserving deep learning approach is failed to protect data
privacy and demonstrated that a malicious participant can learn
personal information of other participant through Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) learning.
The most dominant technique to optimize the loss function
is Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD). SGD is a method to find
the optimal parameter configuration for a ML algorithm. SGD
is applied in various privacy-preserving deep learning models
[9], [10], [14], [17]. PS receives the gradients from mobile
edge devices by using different approaches like round robin,
random order [18], cosine distance [21], time based [19].
The server aggregates the received parameters using Federated
Averaging algorithm [22], and weighted aggregation strategy
[21]. Federated averaging algorithm introduced for model
averaging combines local SGD on each client with a server.
It is robust for unbalanced and non-IID data distributions,
and reduce rounds of communication needed to train a Deep
Learning (DL) model.
C. Game Models
In prior academic research, game theory has been applied
into data privacy game to analyze privacy and accuracy. Pejo
et al. [23] defined two player game, in which one is privacy
concerned and other not. Esposito et al. [24] proposed a game
model to analyze the interaction between a provider (global
ML model) and a requester (local ML model) within a CDL
model. In this literature, there have been various game models
about privacy-accuracy trade-off and energy-efficient solution.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work
to utilize game theory to analyze mobile edge devices’ rational
behavior in a selfish environment. Therefore, we construct a
game model for rational mobile edge devices in CDL and
analyze the game.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We first generically outline details of the CDL model, in
which all edge computing devices, such as mobile phones and
IoT devices are assumed to be altruistic. Then, we clarify the
rationality assumptions of mobile edge devices in CDL model.
A. Collaborative Deep Learning Model
Figure 1 illustrates the main components of the system
model. Consider there are N number of mobile edge devices,
and each mobile edge device is connected with multiple IoT
devices. These IoT devices generate huge amount of data,
which is used for training to build ML model. These devices
train their data to build local models in a collaborative man-





















Fig. 1: A Collaborative Deep Learning System Model
for mobile edge devices and IoT devices. In our model,
we assume that each mobile edge device maintains a local
vector of neural-network parameters, wi. The PS maintains
a separate parameter vector wglobal. Each edge device can
initialize parameters (weights) wi where i=1,2,3,..N randomly
or by downloading their latest values from PS. Each edge
device trains a local model and optimize the loss value using
SGD. Here, one weight sample is selected at random in
each optimization step. This process continues until SGD
converges to a local optimum. Let E be the error or loss value,
i.e., the difference between the true value of the objective
function and the computed output of the network, it can be
based on L2 norm or cross entropy. The back-propagation
algorithm computes the partial derivate of E with respect to
each parameter in wk and updates the parameter so as to
reduce its gradient. We refer to one full iteration over all
available input data as an epoch. All mobile edge devices train
their local models simultaneously through PS.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo Code for Mobile Edge Device i
1: Define initial parameters wi, learning rate α and number
of local epochs H.
2: Repeat all the steps until minimum error is obtained:
3: Download parameters wglobal from PS to learn a common
learning objective.
4: LocalTraining (i,wi): Train local data on each device to
build own ML model
5: Split local dataset Di to minibatches of size K which are
included into the set Ki.
6: for for each local epoch j from 1 to H do
7: for for each k ∈ Ki do
8:





11: Each participant uploads local gradients ∆wi to PS
12: Each participant downloads updated parameters wglobal
and loss value τi of each participant.
There is no need for any coordination among all local
training devices. They can influence each other’s training
indirectly, via PS. PS receives local gradients ∆wi from
each edge devices and aggregates them with global parameter
wglobal. After updating this global parameter, each participant
downloads wglobal parameter from PS and starts training based
on global parameter. There are various scenarios to exchange
the parameters from PS to mobile edge device. In this model,
PS exchanges the parameters asynchronously, i.e. PS does not
wait for all local gradients from all edge devices. When a
participant trains his local model, others may update their
parameters through PS. This process continues until the model
achieves the desired output.
Algorithm 2 Pseudo Code of Parameter Server
1: Set initial global parameters wglobal
2: PS runs these local gradients ∆wi on auxiliary dataset and
calculate loss values τi of each participant
3: PS also aggregates these local gradients ∆wi asyn-
chronously
wglobal = wglobal + ∆wi (2)
B. Mobile Edge Device costs
We now characterize the costs (computation and communi-
cation costs) borne by mobile edge devices and IoT devices
to their participation in CDL system. It should be noted that
our goal is not to arrive at a precise quantification of these
costs, rather to characterize them such that they could be used
to analyze the strategic behavior of the devices while partic-
ipating in CDL. The CDL system is basically grouped into
two phases: (1) Training phase, and (2) Participating phase.
During the training phase, each device builds a local model and
initialize their weights to train the network. During training,
each participant calculates its local gradients to upload on
PS. PS aggregates all the local gradients and sends back to
each device. The updated parameters are downloaded by each
device and training process continues until loss value becomes
negligible.
Thus, we can characterize the total cost for a mobile edge
device to participate in an epoch to build ML model based
on the cost for executing the above two phases. For the
training phase, a mobile edge device bears a cost cplocal, which
is computation cost to build a local ML model. Another
computation cost is cpglobal for training a local model using
updated global parameters. Accordingly, for executing the
participation phase, a mobile edge devices bears another costs
cm’ and cm. The cost cm is communication cost, where a mobile
edge device uploads its parameters to PS, the cost cm’ is also
communication cost, where a mobile edge device i downloads
the updated parameters from PS. The average per mobile edge
devices cost cti for participation in each epoch of collaborative
deep learning system can be characterized as
cti = c
plocal + cm + cm
′
+ cpglobal (3)
TABLE I: List of Symbols.
Symbol Definition
N Number of mobile edge devices
n Total number of IoT devices
K Batch size
H Numbers of local epoch
Di Generated data from IoT device i




θi Loss value of participant i, train individually
φi Loss value of participant i,train collaboratively
τi Loss value of participant i, train individually on auxiliary dataset
B coefficient
cplocal Computation cost to build a local model
cpglobal Computation cost to build a global model
cm Communication cost to upload the parameters to PS
cm’ Communication cost to download the parameters from PS
ci
t Total cost for build a ML model
Ci Number of cooperative participants
N − Ci Number of defective participants
One point that needs further clarification is why a participant
may choose not to spend these costs cm, cm’, and cpglobal. Our
rationality assumption provides this clarification.
C. Rationality Assumption
Prior research in distributed DL [21] have assumed a byzan-
tine adversary where mobile edge devices or IoT devices con-
trolled by adversary can be arbitrarily malicious, i.e. malicious
participant could arbitrarily deviate from suggested protocol in
CDL or could arbitrarily drop communication between mobile
edge device and PS. However, here we assume that mobile
edge devices and IoT devices are honest but they are selfish.
In this setup, the notion of rationality means that a rational
device choose to participate or not to maximize its profit in
CDL.
IV. THE COLLABORATIVE DEEP LEARNING GAME
We present a game model of CDL system with multiple
mobile edge devices in a honest but selfish environment. We
introduce a game model with N -players that we refer to as the
collaborative learning game G. In this game, the edge devices
send their local gradients to PS to learn a common objective
without compromising the privacy of data. PS aggregates the
gradients and creates a global model. This updated global
model is downloaded by all participating edge devices, where
exists a social dilemma for all defection behavior.
A. Game Model
Game theory allows for modeling situations of conflict and
for predicting the behavior of participants when they interact
with each other. In our CDL game G, mobile edge devices who
are connected with multiple IoT devices are participants, they
interact with PS simultaneously without having any knowledge
about each other. The Game G is a static game, because all
participants must choose their strategy simultaneously. The
Game G is a tuple (P, S, U), where P is the set of players, S
is the set of strategies and U is the set of payoff values.
• Players (P ): The set of players P =
∑N
i=1 Pi corre-
sponds to the set of mobile edge devices who received a
common objective from PS to build its own local model
in CDL game G.
• Strategy (S): Each participant Pi can choose between
two actions si (i) Cooperative (CP ) or (ii) Defective
(DF ). Hence the set of strategies in this game is S =
{CP ,DF}. Strategy of mobile edge devices Pi deter-
mines whether Pi participates in CDL. In particular, if a
participant Pi plays CP strategy, i.e., it will send its local
gradients to PS and downloads updated parameters from
PS to update its local model. Here, the participant pays
total cost. In contrast, if a participant Pi neither uploads
its local gradients to PS nor downloads the updated global
parameters from PS, i.e. the mobile edge devices Pi plays
DF strategy. Thus, participants saves its communication
costs cm, cm
′
and global computation cost cpglobal. Here,
this participant is not part of CDL and trains its local
model individually.
• Payoff (U ): At a high level, the players’ goal in CDL
game G is to maximize their utility, which is a function
of the loss value and its costs. In this work, we do not
consider the adversarial aspect of players; hence, the gain
includes only the accuracy improvements on the model
for a particular player as a benefit while the costs are
used for training the models and communication between
participant and PS.
Here, the benefit and the cost are not on the same scale as
the first depends on the loss value while the latter on cost. To
make them comparable, we introduce a coefficient: the benefit
is multiplied with B.
Now, we compute the payoff of mobile edge devices Pi in
this game. If we assume that the participant Pi is cooperative,
i.e. Pi ∈ CP . Similarly, if Pi is defective, i.e. Pi ∈ DF , and
these payoff can be defined as follows.
ui(CP ) = B(
1
φi
)− (cplocal + cm + cm′ + cpglobal) (4)




Based on the above calculated utilities, we analyze the game
G as discussed in the next section.
V. GAME ANALYSIS
In order to get an insight into strategic behavior of partici-
pants, we apply the most fundamental game-theoretic concept,
known as Nash Equilibrium, introduced by John Nash [25].
Definition 1. A Nash Equilibrium is a concept of game
theory where none of the players can unilaterally change their
strategy to increase their payoff.
In other words, if in a non-cooperative game all strategies
are mutual best responses to each other, then no player has
any motivation to deviate unilaterally from the given strategy
one Nash Equilibrium strategy profile. For example, in any
prisoners’ dilemma game, there is always a cooperative strat-
egy and a defecting strategy. If both players use cooperative
strategy, then it yields the best outcome for the players. If the
players do not cooperate with one another, then they choose
defecting strategy in the hope of attaining individual gain at
the rival’s expense. In prisoners’ dilemma defecting strategy
strictly dominates the cooperation strategy. Hence, the only
Nash Equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemma, is a mutual defection.
Based on the cost and benefit of mobile edge devices to
learn a neural-network model, we build a one-shot CDL game
model G. In the following theorems, we show that the game
G is a public good game.
Theorem 1. In CDL game G, if a participant builds its
local ML model, then G reduces to a public good game.
Proof. Let us consider all N participants follow defective-
DF strategy where all participants neither send their local
gradients to PS nor download updated parameters from PS,
i.e., no communication between mobile edge device and PS.
So, participants do not pay any communication costs cm, cm
′
,
and global computation cost cpglobal. Now each participant Pi
trains local data sets Di to build its ML model individually and
minimizes its loss value θi. None of participants cannot change
his strategy profile unilaterally. Let us assume if a participant
deviates from defect-DF strategy to cooperate-CP strategy
unilaterally, then participant will pay all these costs (cm +
cm
′
+ cpglobal). The payoff of cooperate-CP strategy is less
than defect-DF strategy, so All-DF is a Nash equilibrium
profile and G is a public good game.
Theorem 2 further shows we can never enforce an all
cooperate-CP strategy in game G, and therefore, we could
not establish a Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 2. In CDL game G, if a participant builds its local
ML model, then we cannot establish All-Cooperation strategy
profile as a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. We first assume that all N participants have already
cooperated in collaborative learning (i.e., all cooperate-CP
strategy profile) and payed communication costs as well as
global computation cost. We can compute the payoff of each
participant Pi by Equation (4). Hence, if a participant deviates
from the cooperation and play defection unilaterally, its payoff
would be equal to Equation (5), which is always greater than
cooperative payoffs at Equation (4). Hence, each participant
has incentive to deviate unilaterally and increases its payoff.
Then, the All cooperate-CP strategy profile is never a Nash
Equilibrium.
A. Cluster-Based Representation
Each participant has loss values of all other participants,
which is calculated on auxiliary dataset. Before the start of
the game, each participant has to choose his strategy to play
the collaborative game G. However, in the beginning of the
game, the participant is not sure about his strategy, which
will depend on other participant’s strategy. Therefore, all the
participants are in dilemma to choose a strategy between CP



















Fig. 2: Experimental Setup of Proposed Game Model
fair strategy algorithm. K-means clustering is an unsupervised
ML technique, whose purpose is to segment a data set into
K clusters. Each participant applies k-means cluster algorithm
on all loss values (one-dimensional data).
Algorithm 3 Cluster-Based Fair Strategy
1: Apply k-means clustering algorithm on loss values of each
participant i.
2: Make the clusters
3: if participant i belongs a cluster with at least one other
participant j then
4: Pi , Pj ∈ CP
5: else
6: Pi ∈ DF
7: end if
VI. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
To evaluate our proposed cluster-based fair strategy, we
apply this novel strategy on smart home datasets.
A. Datasets
We use ARAS datasets to build smart home interaction
model, since this data is available publicly [5]. ARAS dataset
is real world dataset for activity recognition with ambient
sensing. The living residents did not follow any specific
rules to live in smart homes. This dataset contains two real
smart home data with multiple residents for one month. It
contains 3000 daily life activities captured by 26 million
sensor readings in smart homes. This dataset also has ground
truth labels for activities, which enables to develop a new
sophisticated ML smart home interaction model.
B. Experimental Setup
We simulate the proposed system model with N number
of mobile edge devices associated with smart homes. IoT
Fig. 3: Visualization of k-means Clustering in One Dimen-
sional Loss Value
devices are connected with one mobile edge device in each
smart home. We partitioned ARAS dataset unevenly into
10 participants. For unbalanced datasets setting, the data is
sorted by class and divided into two cases: (a) low quality
dataset, where the participant receives data partition from a
single class, and (b) high quality, where participant receives
data partition from 27 classes. Figure 2 shows unbalanced
partitioning of the dataset, smart home-1 generates high quality
data (multiple IoT devices), while smart home-10 generates
low quality dataset (one IoT device). The following parameters
are used for Algorithm 1 and 2: batch size K = 10 or 100, H
= 1 or 3, α = 0.01.
C. Results
Our goal in this work is to design a mechanism for elicit-
ing cooperation in CDL. Cluster-based fair strategy enforces
participants for cooperation in CDL; however, Theorem 1 and
2 proves that participants defect in CDL. For the unbalanced
datasets, the clusters of loss values are shown in figure 3.
The results show that 80% participants collaborates with
other participants, and 20% participants learns individually by
choosing DF strategy in the game G.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented a system model of CDL, and
introduced the problem of strategic behavior of mobile edge
devices in CDL system. We evaluated rationality of mobile
edge devices in CDL using game theory model, a CDL game.
We also evaluated the Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy profile
for each scenario, where the learning mobile edge devices are
enforced to cooperate using our cluster-based fair strategy in
CDL. We believe that this work is the first step towards a
deeper understanding of the effect of non-cooperative behavior
in CDL. For future work, we plan to extend the model and
evaluation to determine the accuracy of ML/DL model and to
train our proposed model with other IoT datasets.
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